Personal Injury Damages and Inheritance and Gift Taxes--Revenue and Taxation Code Section 13560 by Fabian, JoAnne
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 24 | Issue 2 Article 7
1-1973
Personal Injury Damages and Inheritance and Gift
Taxes--Revenue and Taxation Code Section 13560
JoAnne Fabian
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
JoAnne Fabian, Personal Injury Damages and Inheritance and Gift Taxes--Revenue and Taxation Code Section 13560, 24 Hastings L.J.
329 (1973).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol24/iss2/7
PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES AND INHERITANCE
AND GIFT TAXES-REVENUE AND TAXATION
CODE SECTION 13560
Imputed contributory negligence has long been criticized.' How-
ever, the California legislature's attempts to slay this hydra-headed
monster have served to confuse the characterization of personal injury
recoveries as separate or community property. Prior to 1957, such
recoveries were community property, absent any contrary agreement
between spouses.2 Thus, when a spouse was contributorily negligent,
the other spouse was denied recovery for injuries resulting from the
negligence of a third person.3 In 1957, the legislature attempted to
abrogate this harsh result. California Civil Code section 163.5 was
enacted making "damages . . . awarded" for personal injuries the
separate property of the injured spouse.4 This legislation was sharply
criticized as creating more problems than it solved.5 Therefore, in
1968, it was amended. Once again personal injury damages were
classified as community property except when paid by one spouse to
the other.6
This 1968 amendment does not alleviate all problems. The
wording of the former section 163.5 created confusion and remains a
troublesome area of the law. This is demonstrated by a recent court of
appeals case of first impression. Estate of Rogers' held that a com-
promise settlement is essentially the same as an "award" and therefore
1. E.g., W. PtossER, HANDIBooK oF THE LAw OF TORTS 488 (4th ed. 1971);
James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 IA. L. REV. 340 (1954); Keeton, Imputed
Contributory Negligence, 13 TEXAs L. Ray. 161 (1935).
2. See, e.g., Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 321, 202 P.2d 73, 78 (1949).
3. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text infra.
4. CAL. STAT. 1957, ch. 2334, § 1, at 4065 (amended 1968, repealed 1969).
In 1957 former California Civil Code section 163.5 read "[aIll damages, special and
general, awarded a married person in a civil action for personal injuries, are the sep-
arate property of such married person." This statute was amended by Cal. Stat. 1968,
cl. 457, § 2, at 1078 to read "[all money or other property paid by or on behalf of a
married person to his spouse in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for personal
injuries to the spouse or pursuant to an agreement for the settlement or compromise of
a claim for such damages is the separate property of the injured spouse." The 1968
version was added to the Family Law Act of 1970 by Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8,
at 3338 and is now codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 5109 (West 1970).
5. See notes 55 & 60 infra.
6. See Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 457, § 2, at 1078 (repealed 1969) at note 4 supra.
7. 24 Cal. App. 3d 69, 100 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1972).
must be characterized as separate property. Rogers is also the first
case to construe Revenue and Taxation Code section 13560. This sec-
tion provides that community property having its origin in the separate
property of one spouse shall be treated, for inheritance tax purposes,
as separate property.8 The holding in the Rogers case will have far
reaching effects because compromise settlements are common and for-
mer Civil Code section 163.5 still governs personal injury recoveries
received between 1957 and 1968 when it was in effect.
This note will examine the court's classification of settlements as
separate property and the resulting gift and inheritance tax conse-
quences. The legislative intent of both former Civil Code section
163.5 and Revenue and Taxation Code section 13560 will be anal-
yzed. A discussion of the constitutional validity of that inheritance
tax statute as applied in Rogers will follow. When the statutes are
read together, the result of Rogers is unjust and possibly unconstitu-
tional. This note will show that some form of relief, legislative or
judicial, must be forthcoming.
Background of the Rogers Case
In 1963, Mr. Rogers was severely injured while working as a
welder in the boiler of a ship. The injury was caused by the negli-
gence of one of the shipowner's employees. Mr. Rogers was not con-
tributorily negligent which would have barred his recovery.9 Through
his wife acting as guardian ad litem, he brought suit against the ship-
owner, Southern States Navigation Corporation.'0 The case was set-
8. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 13560 (West 1970) provides that "[i]f one spouse
makes a gift of an interest in separate property to the other and the interest so given,
together with an equal interest retained by the donor, becomes their community
property, such equal interests shall be treated as held by them as their separate prop-
erty, and not as community property, for the purposes of this part." CAL. REV. &
TAX CODE § 15310 (West 1970), enacted as a companion to CAL. Rav. & TAX CODE
§ 13560, provides identical treatment for gift tax purposes.
9. Opening Brief for Appellants at 2, Estate of Rogers, 24 Cal. App. 3d 69,
100 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1972). The accident occurred when an employee of the Southern
States Navigation Corporation, owner of the ship, turned a full head of steam into the
boiler where Mr. Rogers was working. For a period of nearly two years after the
accident Mr. Rogers was confined to hospitals and remained under the care of physi-
cians until his death from a heart attack in 1969. Respondents, The State of California
and Houston Flournoy, Controller, contended that the absence of contributory negli-
gence on the part of Mr. Rogers had no relevance to the issues. Brief for Re-
spondents at 6, 7. This contention appears fallacious when one considers the legisla-
tive intent of former Civil Code section 163.5. This statute was concerned with im-
puted contributory negligence and the absence of such in this situation therefore con-
travenes the intent of the legislation. See note 56 and accompanying text infra.
10. Opening Brief for Appellants at 4, Estate of Rogers, 24 Cal. App. 3d 69,
100 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1972). The original complaint was filed June 12, 1963, in the
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tled before trial, and Mr. Rogers received $265,667 in full settlement
for all claims." From the date of the accident until his death, neither
he nor his wife worked for wages.' 2 The compromise settlement was
treated as community property. For the Rogers, the recovery was in
reality a substitute for income. All living expenses, medical bills
and taxes were paid from this sum.'" When Mr. Rogers died in 1969
he left his entire estate to his wife. 4
Upon his death, California levied a gift tax' 5 as well as an in-
heritance tax.'0 These tax liabilities arose from the compromise settle-
ment only; other community property owned by the Rogers was not in
dispute.' 7  Mrs. Rogers filed two actions which were consolidated for
trial. One was her Objections to Report of Inheritance Tax Ap-
praiser.' 8  The report was upheld. 19  The other action was to recover
the gift tax paid,2° which was denied.2' On appeal both decisions
were affirmed.22
Rogers raised three basic issues which will be considered in de-
tail. The first was whether compromise settlements should be char-
Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco and later removed to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id. at 2. The only source of income prior to the accident was the earnings
of both Mr. and Mrs. Rogers. After the accident Mrs. Rogers did not work,
spending most of her time attending the needs of her husband.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Opening Brief for Appellants at 7.
15. Brief for Respondents at 39. The Controller, in computing the gift tax, al-
lowed for medical expenses, living expenses and certain other expenses and found
that there was about $235,000 traceable to the compromise settlement. Gift tax was
levied on one-half of this amount, or $117,500, this sum representing the gift of sep-
arate property that Mr. Rogers had transmuted to community property. Tax was
levied as of the date of the settlement, June 1, 1964, plus interest and penalty for late
filing. The amount of gift tax was $5,850.73. Id. at 4. The court in Rogers deter-
mined the amount upon which gift tax was levied to be $113,500. Estate of Rogers,
24 Cal. App. 3d 69, 72, 100 Cal. Rptr. 735, 736 (1972). The discrepancy in the
two figures resulted from adjustments made in the course of negotiations between the
parties.
16. Opening Brief for Appellant at 8. The Controller held that $207,590.54
was the amount of assets held by Mr. Rogers at the time of his death. From this
amount, deductions were made for a marital exclusion ($49,410.19), a Revenue and
Taxation Code section 13560 exclusion ($98,820.61) and certain other exclusions
amounting to $14,979.92. The amount upon which the inheritance tax of $2,664.61
was levied was $44,410.19. Record, Statement of Stipulation at 33.
17. Opening Brief for Appellants at 6.
18. Id. at 8.
19. Brief for Respondents at 5.
20. Opening Brief for Appellants at 8.
21. Brief for Respondents at 5.
22. Estate of Rogers, 24 Cal. App. 3d 69, 100 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1972).
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acterized as separate or community property under the language of
former Civil Code section 163.5 which refers only to "damages . . .
awarded. ' 23  If the settlement were held to be community property, it
then would be exempt from inheritance tax under Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code section 13551.2 4  The second issue concerned whether or
not Revenue and Taxation Code section 13560, which would impose
an inheritance tax on community property that had been transmuted
from separate property, should be applied in this case. The third is-
sue was whether Revenue and Taxation Code section 13560 as applied
in situations such as Rogers is unconstitutional as a denial of equal
protection.
Property Classification of Personal Injury Damages
The Law Prior to Civil Code Section 163.5
Under California community property law, all property owned by
either husband26 or wife2" before marriage and "that acquired after-
wards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent . . ." is the separate property
of that spouse.28  All other property acquired during the marriage falls
into the community property category. 29 Therefore, prior to 1957,
the cause of action and the damages recovered for personal injuries
were classified as community property.30 This classification led courts
to deny recovery to an injured spouse if the other spouse were con-
tributorily negligent.31 The denial was based on the theory that be-
cause the recovery was community property the guilty spouse would
profit from his or her own wrong.32 This result was criticized by legal
23. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 2334, § 1, at 4065 (amended 1968, repealed 1969).
See note 4 supra.
24. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 13551 (West 1970) provides that "[ulpon the
death of a spouse: (a) None of the community property transferred to a spouse is
subject to this part [inheritance tax], except as provided in Section 13694 [power of
appointment] ...."
25. See text accompanying notes 86-99 infra.
26. Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 103, § 1, at 254 now codified at CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 5108 (West 1970).
27. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 14 (1849) now codified at CAL. CIv. CODE § 5107
(West 1970).
28. Id.; Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 103, § 1, at 254 now codified at CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 5108 (West 1970).
29. Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 103, § 2, at 254 now codified at CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 5110 (West 1970).
30. McFadden v. Santa Ana 0. & T. St. Ry., 87 Cal. 464, 25 P. 681 (1891).
See Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 3, 314 P.2d 10 (1957); Kesler v. Pabst,
43 Cal. 2d 254, 273 P.2d 257 (1954).
31. E.g., Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949); McFadden
v. Santa Ana 0. & T. St. Ry., 87 Cal. 464, 25 P. 681 (1891).
32. Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal. 2d 622, 630, 248 P.2d 922, 926 (1952). "In the
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writers 3 and some members of the judiciary.34 Legislative efforts
were made in response to this criticism. For example, in 1951, former
Civil Code section 171(c) was enacted . 5 It provided:
[The] wife has the management, control and disposition, other
than testamentary except as otherwise permitted by law, of com-
munity property money earned by her, or community property
money damages received by her for personal injuries suffered by
her, until it is commingled with other community property, except
that the husband shall have management, control and disposition
of such money damages to the extent necessary to pay for expenses
incurred by reason of the wife's personal injuries. 36
Although this statute gave the wife management and control of her
personal injury recoveries, it did little to change the operation of the
imputed contributory negligence rule. 7
In order to avoid denying recovery, the courts softened the ap-
plication of the rule in some cases. For example, a wife was allowed
to recover when her husband died in an accident and thus could not
benefit by his wrongdoing.38  In Washington v. Washington, 9 the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, it is settled that a cause of action for injuries
to either the husband or the wife arising during the marriage and while they are
living together is community property ... Accordingly, in all of these situations it
is ordinarily necessary to impute the negligence of one spouse to the other to prevent
the negligent spouse from profiting by his own wrong."
33. See note 1 supra. The imputation of contributory negligence of one spouse
to another had its origin in the legal identity of the wife with her husband at common
law. Each was charged with the negligence of the other. The Married Women's
Acts have terminated this identity and negligence is no longer imputed on the basis of
the marriage relationship alone. The exception to this is the community property
states that treat personal injury damages as community property and impute contribu-
tory negligence to the spouse to prevent unjust enrichment. See W. PRossER, HAND-
Boor OF THE LA W OF ToRTs 489-90 (4th ed. 1971).
34. E.g., Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 322, 202 P.2d 73, 77 (1949)
(dissenting opinion).
35. Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1102, § 1, at 2860.
36. Id.
37. See Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1102, § 1, at 2861 which also stated that "[tIhis
section shall not be construed as making such money the separate property of the
wife, nor as changing the respective interests of the husband and wife in such money.
." See 2 B. ARMSTRONG, CALn'oNurA FAMILY LAW 1512 (1953): "It would not
seem that C. C. 171(c) ...would alter the Zaragosa rule that contributory negligence
bars the wife's recovery. The damages collected by the wife still are community
property by the terms of the section and the husband has a vested one-half interest
therein." 4 B. WrrE3N, SumMARY OF CALieoRNrA LAW 2711 (7th ed. 1960) states that
"[nlo authoritative determination of the effect of the new statute on the imputed neg-
ligence rule was made."
38. Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal. 2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952).
39. 47 Cal. 2d 249, 302 P.2d 569 (1956). Justice Carter, in his concurring
opinion stated that "[tjhe majority opinion, however illogical in the light of the
Zaragosa case, is a small step in the right direction." Id. at 257, 302 P.2d at 573. The
majority did not directly overrule Zaragosa, however. Much the same reasoning was
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parties were divorced before final judgment. The court held that the
cause of action vested in the injured spouse. Still another case held
that if the parties were domiciled outside California in a non-com-
munity property jurisdiction, there was no reason for the husband's
contributory negligence to bar the wife's recovery.4
Even though the courts did allow these few exceptions, attempts
to circumvent imputed contributory negligence by post-injury property
agreements between husband and wife were ineffective. The accrued
cause of action would become the separate property of the injured
spouse by the contributorily negligent spouse's agreeing to relinquish
his interest. Theoretically, since he had no interest in the property,
he could not profit by his wrong. In Kesler v. Pabst,1 however, this
was rejected. The court held that by giving up his interest in the cause
of action, the husband was relinquishing a major property right and that
this was a benefit to him.42
Enactment of Former Civil Code Section 163.5
These attempts to avoid the rigors of the imputed contributory
negligence rule demonstrated that legislative action was imperative. 3
Two proposed remedies were before the legislature in 1957.4 The
first attacked the problem in a straightforward manner, providing that
"[t]he negligence or contributory negligence of one spouse shall not
be imputed to the other spouse to deny recovery to such spouse in any
used in Foote v. Foote, 170 Cal. App. 2d 435, 339 P.2d 188 (1959) where the parties
were married after the accident.
40. Bruton v. Villoria, 138 Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956). One writer
labels these exceptions as "illogical." 1 CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAWYER 113 (Cal. Cont.
Educ. Bar 1961). It would appear that these distinctions are technical ones that the
court has used to give relief from the imputed contributory negligence rule.
41. 43 Cal. 2d 254, 273 P.2d 257 (1954).
42. Id. at 257, 273 P.2d at 258. "By his act of relinquishment Mr. Kesler
sought to exercise control over his interest in the community cause of action and give
up his rights in the recovery. The right to dispose of property, however, constitutes a
major interest of the owner therein, and if by the exercise of such right the owner
could avoid the effect of his contributory negligence and thus create an enforceable
right in his donee that did not theretofore exist, he would in fact profit by his own
wrong." See Ferguson v. Rogers, 168 Cal. App. 2d 486, 336 P.2d 234 (1959); Com-
ment, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 838 (1954); 6 HASTINGS L.J. 88 (1954).
43. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington, 47 Cal. 2d 249, 255, 302 P.2d 569, 572
(1956) where Justice Carter, concurring, wrote, "I am of the opinion now, as I have
always been, that a cause of action for personal injuries is a separate and personal one
and that the recovery therefor should be the separate property of the injured spouse
except for the actual loss to the community in the earning power of the injured
spouse ....
44. Cal. A.B. 3286 (1957); Cal. S.B. 1826 (1957). See Brunn, California
Personal Injury Damage Awards to Married Persons, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 587 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Brunn].
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action, even though the damages that are recovered are community
property. ' 45  The failure of the legislature to pass this bill 6 led to the
unfortunate result in Rogers. The other proposal was Senate Bill
1826 which became Civil Code section 163.5. It provided that
"[a]ll damages, special and general, awarded a married person in a
civil action for personal injuries, are the separate property of such
married person. ' 47  Concurrently, Civil Code section 171(c) was
amended to delete any reference to the community property nature of
personal injury damages. 48
Former section 163.5 had been recommended previously by a
conference of state bar delegates.49  The legislature, however, did not
follow the model of the state bar resolution carefully. The resolution
had provided that "damages for pain, suffering, disfigurement and
.. . disability [would be the] separate property of the injured
spouse."50 Therefore, all other damages, such as for medical expenses
and loss of earnings, apparently would remain community property.51
The state bar proposal also included reference to both the cause of ac-
tion and damages,5 2 but former section 163.5 referred only to "dam-
ages . . . awarded." No mention was made of compromise settle-
ments.5 3  Because the statute did not attack the problem of imputed
contributory negligence directly, it raised criticism.5 4 The legislature's
failure to follow the carefully drawn state bar proposal opened the
door for erroneous and inconsistent application of the statute in cases
where there was no problem of contributory negligence.
Undoubtedly, the legislature's intent in enacting former section
163.5 was to abolish the imputed contributory negligence rule which
barred recovery by innocent spouses.55 Indeed, the sponsor of the bill,
45. Cal. A.B. 3286 (1957). See Brunn, supra note 44, at 589.
46. 1957 CAL. ASSEMBLY FIN. AISIToRY 1097; CAL. ASSEMBLY J. 6990 (1957).
See Brunn, supra note 44, at 589.
47. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 2334, § 1 at 4065. See note 4 supra for history.
48. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 2334, § 2, at 4066 amending Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1102,
§ 1, at 2860.
49. Conference of Cal. State Bar Delegates, Action on Conference Resolutions, 30
CAL. ST. B.J. 499 (1955).
50. Id.
51. See 4 B. WrrKN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw 2713 (7th ed. 1960).
52. Conference of Cal. State Bar Delegates, Action on Conference Resolutions, 30
CAL. ST. B.J. 499 (1955). See 4 B. WTmKN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 2713 (7th
ed. 1960).
53. See note 4 supra.
54. See notes 55 & 60 infra.
55. 4 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw 2712 (7th ed. 1960) states that
"[tjhe injustice of the imputed negligence rule, and the inadequacy of prior judicial
and legislative attempts to eliminate it, induced the 1957 Legislature to take the bold
step of a complete change in the character of the property. ...
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Senator James A. Cobey, stated, "I might say that my intention was to
outlaw the imputation of the contributory negligence of one spouse to
the other . . . ."I' However, the statute, as construed in Rogers, was
broader than necessary to accomplish this purpose. In Rogers, there
was never any question of contributory negligence.17  By applying
the statute in that situation, the court changed the nature of damages in
all personal injury actions involving a married person.5 s
In addition to inducing erroneous application, section 163.5 failed
to distinguish the various interests which damages reimburse. "[A]I1
damages, special and general . . ." were the separate property of the
injured spouse." There was no provision for reimbursement to the
community for medical expenses paid from community funds or for
compensating the community for the loss of future earnings. The
statute, in effect, forced the injured spouse to treat as separate property
interests such as earnings, which are ordinarily community property. °
Award Versus Compromise Settlement
The legislative purpose for former section 163.561 and the un-
fortunate result reached in Rogers necessitate that an award be dis-
tinguished from a settlement when contributory negligence is not in-
volved. This distinction is neither contrary to a literal construction of
the section nor general community property principles. "It has long
been held in California that both the cause of action and the damages
recovered for personal injuries to either husband or wife are com-
munity property .... ,62 However, former Civil Code section 163.5
Although the new statute [former Civil Code section 163.5] completely solves
the imputed negligence problem, it raises other serious problems ...... See Self v. Self,
58 Cal. 2d 683, 691, 376 P.2d 65, 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1962); 1 CALIFORNIA
FAMILY LAWYER 113 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1961); Committee on Continuing Educa-
tion of the Bar, Selected 1957 Code Legislation, 32 CAL. ST. B.J. 501, 508 (1957).
56. Letter from Senator Cobey to Mr. Ralph N. Kleps, Legislative Council, Sac-
ramento in Comment, Civil Code Section 163.5: Solution or Enigma?, 9 HASTINGS
L.J. 291, 295 n.23 (1958).
57. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
58. Note, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 779, 782 (1957).
59. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 2334, § 1, at 4065 (emphasis added). See note 4 supra
for history.
60. 1 CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAWYER 113 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1961) states:
"Undoubtedly, this legislation arose from dissatisfaction with the imputed negligence
doctrine, and not from any real desire to permit the husband, for example, to give
away without the consent of his wife or to will to a third party money awarded to
him for the loss of his earning power for the rest of his life, which was a community
asset; that nevertheless will be the effect of the statute."
61. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
62. 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 2710 (7th ed. 1960), citing
Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949); Sanderson v. Niemann,
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refers only to "damages . . . awarded . .. in a civil action." 68  A
literal reading excludes the cause of action. The statute is also silent
concerning recoveries by compromise settlement. Because of this si-
lence and traditional community property law, legal writers disagreed
on whether a settlement would be held to be separate or community
property. 4 Arguably, by definition an award is not the same as a
settlement. This is consistent with the definition provided by one
court, "[t]o award is to adjudge, to give or assign by sentence or judi-
cial determination." 5  A settlement is an agreement between the par-
ties to a cause of action, not an award made by a court. Thus, a settle-
ment can be treated as community property under former section
163.5.
There are few cases dealing with the distinction between an
award and a settlement in the personal injury context. One of these,
Estate of Simoni,6 involved an award by the Industrial Accident Com-
mission. The court stated that prior to the enactment of section
163.5, compensation payable under the Workmen's Compensation In-
surance and Safety Act was community property."7 The court con-
tinued:
It does not appear that the Legislature intended ...to change
the character of such an award. If such a change had been con-
templated... [it] would have [been] expressly so stated.
The award by the Industrial Accident Commission was not
an award of damages in a civil action within the meaning of section
163.5 of the Civil Code. 8
17 Cal. 2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941); Giorgetti v. Wollaston, 83 Cal. App. 358,
257 P. 109 (1927).
63. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 2334, § 1, at 4065 (amended 1968, repealed 1969).
See note 4 supra.
64. 1 CAtmomA FAMLY LAWYER 113 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1961) states that
"[the statute does not mention the cause of action itself or amounts received in com-
promise of such actions, but it would seem that the intention was probably to make those
separate also." See Comment, Civil Code Section 163.5: Solution or Enigma?, 9
HASIINGS L.J. 291, 304-05 (1958). A contrary view is expressed by a writer who
takes the language of the statute literally and concludes that "it seems quite likely that
the property nature of any recovery by way of settlement is not affected." Note, 45
CALi. L. REv. 779, 780 n.2 (1957). See Committee on Continuing Education of the
Bar, Selected 1957 Code Legislation, 32 CAL. ST. B.J. 501, 508 (1957). Still another
commentator expresses the view that "[flrom a practical standpoint, there would ap-
pear to be no justification for treating settlements differently from judgments." Brunn,
supra note 44, at 597.
65. Hobson v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 60, 66, 230 P. 456, 458 (1924).
66. 220 Cal. App. 2d 339, 33 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1963).
67. Id. at 344, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
68. Id. It is conceded, however, that in workmen's compensation cases con-
tributory negligence is not a defense as a matter of law and therefore these awards
are distinguishable from those received in a civil action. In Rogers there was no con-
tributory negligence as a matter of fact. See note 9 supra.
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In Blankenship v. Blankenship, 9 the question of the characteri-
zation of a compromise settlement was squarely presented. The court,
however, did not find it necessary to decide the issue. On appeal Mr.
Blankenship did not pursue his argument that a personal injury settle-
ment was separate property. Interestingly, however, "[t]he [trial]
court found the settlement proceeds and the truck and trailer [bought
with the proceeds] were the community property of the parties . ...
Despite this lack of case law, a strong argument for distin-
guishing between awards and compromise settlements can be made.
This argument is based on the legislative purpose of former Civil
Code section 163.5.71 The problem of imputed contributory negli-
gence simply does not arise when a case is settled. Furthermore, the
statue does not speak of settlements. In fact, the legislature did not
follow the format suggested by the state bar committee. That sugges-
tion included compromise settlements.72 Unless the statute is strictly
construed, as it was in Estate of Simoni,7' its application to settlements
goes beyond the legislative intent. Thus, the Rogers court exceeded
community property principles and departed from the statute's purpose
in applying former section 163.5.
The Tax Consequences of Former Civil Code Section 163.5
The result in Rogers is due to the unfavorable gift and inherit-
ance tax74 consequences that arose when Mr. and Mrs. Rogers treated
his separate property as community property. Even if personal injury
recoveries are characterized as separate property, that property can be
converted to community property by consent of the spouses.75 Indeed,
this is what the Rogers actually did. The California Law Revision
Commission elucidated the resulting tax problems quite succinctly:
Some couples may, by commingling a damages award with
community property, convert it to community property and inad-
69. 212 Cal. App. 2d 736, 28 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1963).
70. Id. at 748, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
71. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
72. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
73. 220 Cal. App. 2d 339, 33 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1963). See text accompanying
notes 66-68 supra.
74. Gift and inheritance taxes are excise taxes. A gift tax is one that is levied
on the privilege of inter vivos transfer of property made with a donative intent from
donor to donee. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 15104 (West 1970). On the other hand,
"California inheritance tax is imposed on the right or privilege to succeed to or take
property from a decedent. It is a succession tax [on the property] charged to the bene-
ficiaries of the decedent's property rather than a tax on the property itself." I
CALIFORNIA DECEDENT ESTATE ADMINISTRATION 562 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1971).
Gift and inheritance taxes then are taxes on two distinct property interests.
75. See Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 321, 202 P.2d 73, 77 (1949); To-
maier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 757-58, 146 P.2d 905, 907 (1944).
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vertently incur a gift tax liability upon which penalties and interest
may accrue for years before they realize that the liability exists.
Upon the death of the injured spouse, the damages awarded
for personal injuries are subject to an inheritance tax even though
they are inherited by the surviving spouse, while other community
property goes to the surviving spouse tax free. 76
The legislature in enacting former Civil Code section 163.5 did not
intend to create a class of property which would be subject to taxes in
this way. However, this is precisely what resulted from Rogers' ap-
plication of former Civil Code section 163.5 and Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code section 13560.
Legislative Intent of Revenue and Taxation Code Section 13560
The taxation of the settlement in Rogers arose from the interac-
tion of the erroneous application of section 163.5 and Revenue and
Taxation Code section 13560. The application of the latter provision
also was contrary to the purpose of that section. In 1965, the legis-
lature undertook to revise the laws dealing with gift and inheritance
taxes. Revenue and Taxation Code section 1530177 was amended to
allow gift tax-free transfers of community property between spouses. 78
Thus, the gift tax treatment of community property became consistent
with that of the inheritance tax under section 13551. 79  These two
statutes provided a "completely tax-free, inter-spousal rule for com-
mumity property gifts."80  A state bar committee saw a possible
loophole. Some tax liabilities could be avoided by a two-step conver-
sion of "separate property [first] to community property and .
then . . . to the separate property of the other spouse by gift."-
Under this process, gift tax would be paid on one-half of the separate
property that was converted to community property. Then, because
76. 8 CALiO RNI LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS &
STUmES, 407, 408 (1967).
77. CAL. REv. & TAx CODE § 15301 (West 1970) provides that "[in the case of
a transfer to either spouse by the other of community property, none of the property
transferred is subject to this part [gift tax]."
78. CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 15301 (West 1970) amending Cal. Stat. 1965,
ch. 1070, § 8, at 2720. See note 81 infra.
79. See CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 13551 (West 1970) which states that "[ulpon
the death of a spouse: (a) None of the community property transferred to a spouse
is subject to this part [inheritance tax], except as provided in Section 13694 [power
of appointment]."
80. Martin & Miller, Estate Planning and Equal Rights, 40 CAL. ST. BJ. 706,
710 (1965).
81. Id. See generally Committee on Taxation, Report, 39 CAL. ST. B.J. 560,
575-78 (1964). Cal. Stat. 1943, ch. 658, § 1, at 2337 (repealed 1965) previously
had taken care of this problem by imposing a gift tax at the donor's death. This was
thought to be an incongruous way to handle the problem and repeal of this section
was recommended. Committee on Taxation, Report, 39 CAL. ST. BJ. 560, 564 (1964).
January 19731
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Revenue and Taxation Code section 1530182 provided for tax-free
gifts of community property between spouses, the other one-half would
escape tax completely when it was transferred to the separate property
of the other spouse.
Revenue and Taxation Code section 13560 was recommended by
the committee. 83  It provides that for tax purposes, community prop-
erty that had its origin in the separate property of one spouse, shall be
treated as separate property and not community property.84 There-
fore, it is clear that the legislature's intent in enacting Revenue and
Taxation Code section 13560 was to prevent tax avoidance through a
two-step conversion of separate property. 85 The application of this
tax provision to the facts of Rogers therefore is not in accord with the
legislature's intent. Additionally, this application raises serious con-
stitutional questions.
Constitutional Considerations of Revenue and
Taxation Code Section 13560
The state has wide discretion to classify property for taxation
purposes and to tax transfers by gift or inheritance:
In the field of taxation the Legislature has wide discretion to class-
ify. As the United States Supreme Court said with reference to
the California inheritance tax: "But we do not find it necessary
to discuss the issue thus raised, for it has been repeatedly held by
this court that the power of testamentary disposition and the privi-
lege of inheritance are subject to state taxation and state regula-
tion, and that regulatory taxing provisions, even though they pro-
duce inequalities in taxation, do not affect an unconstitutional tak-
ing of property .... "86
This broad power may be a barrier to a constitutional attack on the
application of Revenue and Taxation Code section 13560 in the
Rogers case. However, the legislature must act within constitutional
limitations and the legislation must provide that,
all persons subjected to such legislation within the classification are
treated with equality and. . . that the classification itself be rested
82. See note 79 supra. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 13551 (West 1970) provides
for inheritance tax free transfer of community property from decedent to surviving
spouse.
83. See Committee on Taxation, Report, 39 CAL. ST. B.J. 560, 568 (1964).
84. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 13560 (West 1970); id. § 15310 (West 1970).
See note 8 supra.
85. Committee on Taxation, Report, 39 CAL. ST. B.J. 560, 578 (1964). "The
enactment of these new sections would, in effect, confine the exemption from gift tax
of inter-spouse transfers of community property to community property which was
such from the moment of acquisition by either spouse, or which was created by agree-
ment from property acquired by gift from others, or which was created by agree-
ment following a purchase by one spouse of an interest in the other's separate property."
86. Estate of Rogers, 245 Cal. App. 2d 101, 104, 53 Cal. Rptr. 572, 574 (1966).
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upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation.87
In other words, the classification must not be arbitrary nor discrimina-
tory.
Mrs. Rogers belongs to a class of persons who receive community
property by transfer at the death of a spouse. Most other members
of this class receive their community property tax free. It is true that
Mrs. Rogers also may belong to a sub-class, which includes spouses
whose predeceased spouses received a personal injury settlement. In
either event, the question is whether the classification is reasonable
and bears substantial relation to the purpose of the statute. If not,
equal protection is possibly denied.
There are two apparent bases upon which the classification of
spouses standing in the position of Mrs. Rogers can be questioned.
First, the nature of personal injury recoveries makes them actually
more analogous to income than gifts. Damages include medical ex-
penses and compensation for the loss of future earnings. These are
clearly community in nature.88 In addition, pain and suffering are a
detriment to the community; when one spouse is injured, that spouse
suffers, but so, too, does the marital community.80 The burden on the
non-injured spouse is clearly demonstrated in Rogers. 0 Given the
extent to which the community is damaged, the classification of dam-
ages as separate property hardly can be deemed reasonable.
Secondly, even assuming that the compromise settlement in Rog-
ers was correctly classified as separate property, it became community
property for all purposes other than taxation.9 1 This was because Mr.
and Mrs. Rogers treated the settlement as community property. It was
subject to the same rules of management and control and disposition
by will, gift or succession as community property obtained in other
ways.0 2  When the property was transmuted and the gift tax liability
incurred, Mrs. Rogers gained a vested interest in that community
property. 3 To apply Revenue and Taxation Code section 13560 to
this type of community property is not a rational distinction.
87. Id. at 105, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
88. Considering the fact that some personal injury damages are compensation for
interests that traditionally have been considered community in nature, as a practical
matter, it makes no difference whether the damages are received by award or compro-
mise. However, to then classify these damages as separate property defeats the very
purpose of compensation for the community injury.
89. See Deshotel v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 669, 328 P.2d
449, 452 (1958) (Carter, J., dissenting).
90. See notes 9 & 12 supra.
91. See CAL. Crv. CoDE § 5103 (West 1970). See Bank of America Nat.
Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Rogan, 33 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
92. See CAL. Crv. CoDE § 5103 (West 1970).
93. This could be accomplished under Revenue and Taxation Code section 13551.
See note 79 supra.
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Considering the nature of personal injury recoveries 94 and the
treatment given the settlement by the Rogers,95 the classification in
Rogers is unreasonable. In addition to being unreasonable, the classi-
fication does not bear a fair and substantial relationship to the object
of the legislation. When the legislative purposes for both former Civil
Code section 163.5 and Revenue and Taxation Code section 13560
are read together, personal injury recoveries should not be taxed under
the latter section. Former section 163.5 was enacted to abrogate the
imputed contributory negligence rule9" Revenue and Taxation Code
section 13560 was adopted to prevent tax avoidance by one spouse
transferring separate property to the marital community and then from
the community to the separate property of the other spouse.97 As has
been discussed,98 neither of these problems confronted the court in
Rogers. Thus, the classification of personal injury recoveries, whether
from awards or settlements, as separate property for the purposes of
taxation is arbitrary and discriminatory, having no fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation. "Equality of burden is a
fundamental principle of taxation. Equal protection demands that
similar property be taxed by the same yardstick to those similarly situ-
ated." 99  Mrs. Rogers is denied equal protection because her com-
munity property is taxed differently from that of other spouses whose
predeceased spouses have recovered damages for personal injuries.
Rationale for Relief from Tax Burden
The 1968 Amendment of Former Civil Code Section 163.5
A 1968 amendment was motivated by frank recognition of the
problems generated by former section 163.5. This amendment at-
tacked the rule of imputed contributory negligence directly. The Cal-
ifornia Law Revision Commission in 1967 had stated:
To eliminate . . . [the] undesirable ramifications of Section
163.5, the Commission recommends the enactment of legislation
that would again make personal injury damages awarded to a
married person community property. The problem of imputed
contributory negligence should be met in some less drastic way
than by converting all such damages into separate property even
where no contributory negligence is involved.
Although personal injury damages awarded to a married per-
son should be community property as a general rule, the Commis-
sion recommends retention of the rule that such damages are
94. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
95. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
96. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
97. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 9 & 85 and accompanying text supra.
99. Estate of Legatos, I Cal. App. 3d 657, 661, 81 Cal. Rptr. 910, 913 (1969).
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separate property when they are paid in compensation for an in-jury inflicted by the other spouse. 00
In 1968, the legislature amended former Civil Code section 163.5101
to comply with the recommendation of the Law Revision Commission.
To prevent the rule of imputed contributory negligence from being ap-
plied again, the legislature simultaneously enacted former Civil Code
section 164.6 which provided that the contributory negligence of the
spouse was not a defense in any action brought by the injured person
except where it would be a defense if no marriage existed.'
Thus, damages for personal injuries are again community prop-
erty. However, under the Rogers decision,. Californians, who received
personal injury damages by settlement during the time that former
Civil Code section 163.5 was in effect, are left to pay the penalty for
the earlier piecemeal, ambiguous legislation. For the period between
1957 and 1968, an unequal burden of taxation is placed on that class
of spouses who received personal injury damages. This is unjust.
The policy behind community property is that of equality between
husband and wife and the contributions each makes to the marital
community. 0 3  When a spouse is injured, the community is dam-
aged. 104 However, when the damages are characterized as the sepa-
rate property of the injured spouse, the marital community is not com-
pensated. 105 Furthermore, given the legislative intent of both former
Civil Code section 163.5100 and Revenue and Taxation Code section
13560107 and the resulting constitutional problems, judicial or legisla-
tive remedies must be provided.
100. 8 CALUORNrA LAW REViSION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMmENDATIONS &
STuDiEs, 407, 408-09 (1967).
101. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 457, § 2, at 1078 (repealed 1969).
102. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 457, § 3, at 1078. This was incorporated into the
Family Law Act of 1970 by Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, at 3339 and is now CAL.
CIV. CODE § 5112 (West 1970). The statute states that "[ilf a married person is
injured by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of a person other than his spouse,
the fact that the negligent or wrongful act or omission of the spouse of the injured
person was a concurring cause of the injury is not a defense in any action brought by
the injured person to recover damages for such injury except in cases where such con-
curring negligent or wrongful act or omission would be a defense if the marriage did
not exist."
103. W. DEFuNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 24 (2d
ed. 1971).
104. Some writers suggest that there are really two causes of action arising from
the same accident. One is in the injured spouse for pain and suffering and should
be the separate property of that spouse. The other is in the marital community for
medical expenses and compensation for loss of future earnings. See W. DEF N A &
M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CoMMuNrry PROPERTY 202-05 (2d ed. 1971); Brunn, supra
note 44, at 557.
105. See text accompanying note 59 & 60 supra.
106. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
107. See text at note 83-85 supra.
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Relief from Revenue and Taxation Code Section 13560
Relief from the tax burden of Revenue and Taxation Code sec-
tion 13560 as applied to "damages . . . awarded" should be granted.
Complete relief will be afforded if the legislature makes both awards
and compromise settlements community property for the purposes of
taxation. This can be accomplished by amending Revenue and Tax-
ation Code section 13560 so that it does not apply to personal injury
damages recovered while former Civil Code section 163.5, as it read
in 1957,18 was in effect. This will afford complete relief. The relief
will be reconcilable with former section 163.5. Even though that
statute provides that "awards . . . granted" are to be the separate
property of the injured spouse, its sole purpose was to abrogate the
rigors of imputed contributory negligence. The courts can provide
this solution and avoid the possible constitutional conflict without nul-
lifying the legislative purpose of either former section 163.5 or Rev-
enue and Taxation Code section 13560.109
Assuming a reluctance to provide the complete relief described
above, equitable relief can be given to those in the position of Mrs.
Rogers by strictly construing former section 163.5. The courts can
find that settlements are not the same as "awards . . . granted" within
the meaning of former Civil Code section 163.5. Therefore, settle-
ments would be community property. While this may be regarded as
a technical distinction, it is not repugnant to the legislature's intent.
Indeed, in order to avoid the harsh results of Rogers, the legislature
itself has corrected the ambiguities inherent in the statute." 0
Conclusion
The characterization of compromise settlements as separate prop-
erty and the attendant tax consequences will have wide impact. In the
ten years that former Civil Code section 163.5 was in effect, probably
thousands of personal injury cases were settled. Since Rogers is the
first case to apply former section 163.5 to compromise settlements,
many spouses will have treated these settlements as community prop-
erty. In all likelihood most people treat settlements as community
property because medical expenses and compensation for loss of earn-
108. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 2334, § 1, at 4065 (amended 1968, repealed 1969).
See note 4 supra.
109. Rogers is the first case to construe former Civil Code section 163.5 as
applying to "compromise settlements" and also the first case to construe Revenue and
Taxation Code section 13560. It is true that the Supreme Court of California refused
to hear the case, but this does not necessarily imply approval of the court of appeals
decision. See generally Kanner, It's a Busy Court: The Effect of Denial of Hearing
by the Supreme Court on Court of Appeals Decisions, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 188 (1972).
110. See text accompanying notes 88-94 supra.
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ings are contained in the lump sum. This practical fact makes the
holding of Rogers so inequitable. Under the Rogers decision, spouses
who have treated settlements as community property will incur gift tax
liability plus penalty and interest. They will also be subject to in-
heritance tax. In light of the law prior to 1957 and after 1968, the
treatment of personal injury recoveries from settlements in this manner
creates an unjust situation. This injustice is especially acute because
the statutory language was so ambiguous.
These factors point out the harshness of the Rogers result. Addi-
tionally, classification of personal injury recoveries as separate prop-
erty for the purposes of taxation is irrational and bears no fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation. This classification
is not necessary to give effect to the purpose of former California Civil
Code section 163.5. Likewise, Revenue and Taxation Code section
13560 need not be applied to cases such as Rogers in order to fulfill
the legislature's intent. Indeed, if Revenue and Taxation Code sec-
tion 13560 is applied in such situations, serious constitutional questions
are raised.
This note has suggested solutions which will alleviate the hard-
ships and constitutional questions raised by the Rogers decision.
These proposals would prevent the application of Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code section 13560 to similar situations. Once the unfair tax
consequences are eliminated, the hydra-headed monster of imputed
contributory negligence finally will be laid to rest.
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